30,000 troops enroute to Afghanistan. It's unofficially called the "Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy."
The first additional U.S. forces will begin to arrive in Afghanistan within two or three weeks, and when all of them are in place, about 100,000 troops will be in Afghanistan.
The plan sounds alot like McChrystal's assessment and proposed handling of the war, with less troops, and possibly a shorter time-table.
Secretary of Defense Gates says the strategy offers the best possibility to decisively change the momentum in Afghanistan and fundamentally alter the strategic equation in Pakistan and Central Asia. He also said that defeating Al-Qaeda and enhancing Afghan security are mutually reinforcing missions that cannot be untethered from one another, as much as we might wish that to be the case.
The plans include steam rolling the Taliban out of the areas they control in Afghanistan and eliminating Al-Qaeda as a threat in Afghanistan and Pakistan. A weak Pakistan government with elements sympathetic to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban led to a resurgence of these groups in Afghanistan.
Gates' assessment: "The Taliban in Pakistan, with al-Qaeda’s help, have escalated bombing attacks throughout the country. In the spring, they launched operations that took the extremist group to within 60 miles of Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. The Pakistani army has moved decisively against this threat and also has launched operations in South Waziristan – part of the federally administered tribal area that holds al-Qaeda and Taliban safe havens.If Islamic extremists are successful in Central and South Asia, it would strengthen al-Qaeda in particular and extremist groups in general.
Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Armed Services Committee the strategy provides sufficient resources for Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, to reverse gains insurgent groups have made in recent years. “It gets the most U.S. force into the fight as quickly as possible, giving General McChrystal everything he needs in 2010 to gain the initiative,” the chairman said.
“We now have the force of strategy more appropriately matched to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and resources matched more appropriately to that strategy, particularly with regard to reversing the insurgency's momentum in 2010,” said Mullen.
The additional U.S. troops likely will comprise two or three more brigade combat teams and a brigade-sized element committed to embedding with and training their Afghan counterparts, which represents a key component undergirding the transfer of responsibility to Afghanistan, expected to begin in July.
Mullen said the strategy provides commanders “discrete objectives” and offers better guidance about how to employ their forces. While the goals of thwarting al-Qaeda, preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven and employing a counterinsurgency approach are unchanged, the strategy engenders a more defined scope, he said.
“Now, they will tailor this campaign and those operations by focusing on key population areas, by increasing pressure on al-Qaeda's leadership, by more effectively working to degrade the Taliban's influence and by streamlining and accelerating the growth of competent Afghan national security forces,” Mullen said.
The Goal?
U.S. strategy aims to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and reduce its strength, while providing the time and space necessary for the Afghans to develop enough security and governance capacity to stabilize their own country. Roll back the Taliban, deny them access to the Afghan people, disrupt them outside secured areas, prevent al-Qaeda from regaining sanctuary and degrade Taliban capabilities to levels that allow Afghan national security forces to take the lead. The strategy also calls for increasing the size and capability of Afghan security forces and selectively building the Afghan government’s capacity, particularly in key ministries.
The strategy also calls for increasing the size and capability of Afghan security forces and selectively building the Afghan government’s capacity, particularly in key ministries.
“This approach is not open-ended ‘nation building,’” Gates said. “It is neither necessary nor feasible to create a modern, centralized, Western-style Afghan nation-state, the likes of which has never been seen in that country.”
It also does not mean pacifying every village from one end of Afghanistan to the other, the secretary said. “It is, instead, a narrower focus tied more tightly to our core goal of disrupting, dismantling and eventually defeating al-Qaeda by building the capacity of the Afghans – capacity that will be measured by observable progress on clear objectives, and not simply by the passage of time.”
The civil-military plan is to clear, hold, build and transfer.
“The plan clearly is that we will not transition security responsibility to the Afghans until the Afghans have the capacity, in that district or that province, to be able to manage the security situation on their own, with us and our allies initially in a tactical overwatch, and then a strategic overwatch, situation. Commanders will look at the situation on the ground just as commanders in Iraq did, and will assess security district by district and province by province. So the ability of the Afghans to take this on will depend on the circumstances in each of these areas. Afghan forces will need additional training and then will deploy as partners with U.S. and NATO forces. One of the purposes of the U.S. going in with additional forces is not just to partner with the Afghans and not just to train the Afghans, but [also] to degrade the capabilities of the Taliban,” Secretary Gates said.
WHERE WILL ADDITIONAL TROOPS BE DEPLOYED?
A defense official said a portion of the additional troops are likely to reinforce the country’s contentious eastern and southern areas. "A chief responsibility of Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, will be to determine where to apply the added resources if the president authorizes them," the official said.
“I would think he would want to reinforce some of his forces in the east and the south where the main effort by the Taliban and associated forces have been,” the official said of McChrystal. “But it’s up to him, based on the types of troops he has and where he needs them first and how he’s going to use them.”
The distribution of additional troops would factor in the current U.S. footprint in Afghanistan, which comprises about 68,000 troops -- a mixture of combat forces and trainers -- spread throughout, but with the east and south serving as focal points. Troops under NATO’s command add a complement of 42,000 troops.
"Though violence has risen across the board in recent years in Afghanistan, the bloodshed is most intense in the country’s east and south, which have seen more than a two-fold increase in the use of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs," Pentagon spokesman Army Lt. Col. Mark Wright said.
"Two U.S. Army brigade combat teams, or BCTs, each with about 3,500 to 4,000 soldiers, are operating in Regional Command South -- one of five regional commands in Afghanistan comprising international forces under NATO leadership. The 2nd Infantry Division’s 5th Stryker BCT of Fort Lewis, Wash., operates in eastern and northern Kandahar province and western Zabul province, and the 82nd Airborne Division’s 4th BCT of Fort Bragg, N.C., performs advisory roles and training in the region," he said.
Attacks involving IEDs -- the No. 1 killer of U.S. forces in Afghanistan -- is especially rampant in the south, Wright said.
“The Strykers have met a lot of resistance in the Kandahar province,” he said of the 5th Stryker BCT, which employs eight-wheeled armored combat vehicles. “Around [Kandahar] city and out farther into the countryside, there have been a lot of IEDs. They’ve suffered some really significant casualties.”
The Institute for the Study of War, a think-tank headed by Kimberly Kagan, a member of McChrystal’s assessment team, cites the Taliban under Mullah Mohammed Omar as the main threat to stability in southern Afghanistan.
In July, U.S. Marines and Afghan security forces launched an operation in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand River valley, waging war against Taliban operatives in the area.
Currently, some 8,000 Marines of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade of Camp Lejeune, N.C., are responsible for southern and western Helmand province and in the western border province of Farah.
The biggest security threat in eastern Afghanistan, which includes a war-ravaged border area with Pakistan that spans some 450 miles, is the Haqqani network, an insurgent group with ties to al-Qaeda, according to the Institute for the Study of War.
“In the east, it’s been pretty much a constant fight,” said Wright, citing a large battle in the area’s Nuristan province in October, where some 18 months earlier a battle raged for control of the Wanat district. “The same province has seen some fairly significant combat in significant numbers – hundreds of Taliban gathered and launching attacks against [U.S.] forces. So it’s a pretty intense, ongoing fight there.”
Wright also made the following points:
"Of the four American BCTs engaged in eastern Afghanistan, the 10th Mountain Division’s 3rd BCT of Fort Drum, NY, has operated in the Logar and Wardak provinces since January, and the 25th Infantry Division’s 4th Airborne BCT of Wahiawa, Hawaii, has been engaged in Paktia, Paktika, and Khowst provinces since March."
"In addition, the 4th Infantry Division’s 4th BCT of Fort Carson, Colo., deployed to Nuristan, Nangahar, Kunar and Laghman provinces in June, and the 48th BCT of the Georgia National Guard deployed as an advisory brigade to Regional Command East in May."
"Even with the sustained focus on the south and east, more troops are likely to deploy there if McChrystal determines those areas to have the biggest needs."
“For whatever forces are authorized by the president, [McChrystal’s] going to have to make his decision based on priority of need and where they’d be most useful, where those additional resources can be applied."
ARE WE DOING THIS ALONE? THE "NATO" FACTOR:
Sec. of Defense Gates said he has received commitments from allies for more military forces. “We have received private commitments from some countries, but because they have not yet announced them at home, we're not in a position to make that announcement for them. I will just give you an example. I made two telephone calls [the] day before yesterday, and … I received the assurances of between 1,800 and 2,000 troops,” said Gates.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he expects the alliance and its partners will make a “substantial increase” in their contributions.
The secretary general noted that Afghanistan is not a U.S. mission alone.
“America's allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs and burdens of this mission from the beginning,” he said. “As the U.S. increases its commitment, I am confident that the other allies, as well as our partners in the mission, will also make a substantial increase in their contribution.”
On the eve of the a two-day meeting of NATO foreign ministers this week, Rasmussen called upon alliance members and partners to follow the U.S. example and increase their commitments.
“In 2010, the non-U.S. members of this mission will send at least 5,000 more soldiers, and probably more,” the secretary general said at a news conference in Brussels, Belgium. “At this very important moment, NATO must demonstrate its unity and its strength once again.”
Rasmussen said he has pressed allies and partners to fully resource NATO’s training mission in Afghanistan with a view toward helping to foster the transition to Afghans taking the lead. He also emphasized that the International Security Assistance Force mission would not end until Afghans are capable of securing and running their country themselves.
“Our strategy is very clear: to transfer lead responsibility for running their own country to the Afghans, as soon as possible,” the secretary general said. “But transition is not a code word for exit strategy. It means transition to a more supporting role [for allies and partners].”
Rasmussen added that more development assistance and a stepped-up effort on the civilian side of the effort would “create a new momentum in the mission in 2010.” At the upcoming foreign ministers meeting, he noted, allies and partners will discuss not only the military operation, but also the broader political strategy in Afghanistan, which includes the promotion of good governance throughout the country.
AND WHAT OF "THE CIVILIAN FRONT?"
Cautious about stating that the U.S. was essentially "nation-building" in Afghanistan, Gates said that Improving governance in Afghanistan is important to the strategy, and that it calls for U.S. and NATO leaders to focus not only on the national government in Kabul, but also on provincial and district officials and tribal leaders. He emphasized that the key here is community security organizations that are willing to work with the government in Kabul and that do not become the militias for warlords.
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry and Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander in Afghanistan, are working on the joint civil-military campaign plan. That plan will establish the base for transition to Afghan security forces.
The Defense Secretary did not hold back on remarking about U.S. shortcomings, specifically the State Department. He said the State Department seems to lack the kind of flexibility and agility it needs to spend money and make commitments quickly, citing restrictions and processes State Department officials must to go through with respect to their funds.
Detailing the civilian aspect of the war Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, “Civilian experts and advisors are helping to craft policy inside [Afghan] government ministries, providing development assistance in the field, and working in scores of other roles, When our Marines went into Nawa this July, we had civilians on the ground with them to coordinate assistance the next day.”
"For the nonmilitary portion of the president’s strategy to be effective," Clinton said, "the Afghan people and the United States must hold Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government accountable for keeping its promise to fight corruption and improve governance. The State Department intends to help in strengthening Afghan institutions at every level of society so that the country doesn’t fall into chaos when U.S. troops begin to withdraw in 2011."
As part of the effort to shore up Afghanistan and prepare it to take responsibility for its own security, the civilian strategy involves supporting an Afghan-led effort to welcome Taliban members who want to become productive members of Afghan society.
“We understand that some of those who fight with the insurgency do so not out of conviction, but due to coercion or money,” Clinton said. “All Afghans should have the choice to pursue a better future if they do so peacefully, respect the basic human rights of their fellow citizens and reintegrate into their society.”
"The economy is another factor in the State Department’s key to success in Afghanistan," said Clinton. "A civilian corps with expertise in such things as governance and agriculture -- the traditional core of the Afghan economy -- will go a long way to bolstering the country’s independence," she said.
“We will be delivering high-impact assistance and bolstering Afghanistan’s agricultural sector,” the secretary said. “This will create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receives from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off the battlefield.”
The State Department’s role in stabilizing Afghanistan will take it outside that country’s borders to neighboring Pakistan, Clinton said. The country of 175 million with a nuclear arsenal and its own challenges must become a key partner in the fight against violent extremism, she said, noting that terrorist attacks in Pakistan earlier this year have made the country increasingly aware that it shares a common enemy with the United States.
“We will significantly expand support intended to help develop the potential of Pakistan and its people,” she said. “We will do so by demonstrating the United States’ commitment to addressing problems that affect the everyday lives of Pakistanis and bring our people closer together.”
The partnership also will bolster the country, currently a safe haven for and target of terrorists, against the threat of extremism, said the secretary added.
The United States will not face these challenges, military or civilian, alone, Clinton said. “We share this responsibility with governments around the world."
The United States is looking beyond NATO to build the broadest possible global coalition to meet the challenges ahead, Clinton said.
“Our NATO allies have already made significant contributions of their own in Afghanistan, … and we’re also asking the international community to expand its support to Pakistan.”
WHAT ABOUT THE 2011 JULY DEADLINE?
Secretary of Defense Gates clarified that July 2011 is the beginning, not the end, of the process of U.S. forces coming home, noting that any transition will be based on conditions on the ground and that the centerpiece of U.S. debates on the strategy was how to get the Afghans to step up and take responsibility for their own future in a way that allows us to have confidence that they will not once again become the safe haven for Al-Qaeda.
“I think that there are at least two principal audiences,” Gates said of the July 2011 date announcement. “One audience [is] the Afghan government, [which] must accept responsibility in terms of their own governance, in terms of their own security forces, in terms of accepting their responsibility and … taking ownership of this conflict on their own soil, that it's not just going to be fought by foreigners on their behalf.
“I think the other audience,” he continued, “is the American people, who are weary after eight years of war, and to let them know this isn't going to go on for another 10 years.”
Though any reduction in U.S. forces in July 2011 would be based on conditions on the ground, the Defense Department expects to be able to transition uncontested areas to Afghan responsibility and gradually draw down at that time. The July 2011 date was chosen because it will be two years after Marines arrived in Helmand province from an earlier increase in forces, Gates said. Gates suggested that the July 2011 marker for withdrawal is a target date, and not a binding commitment.
“It will be based on conditions on the ground,” said Gates. “But by the same token, we want to communicate to the Afghans that this is not an open-ended commitment on the part of the American people and our allies around the world.
“We have to build a fire under them, frankly,” he added, “to get them to do the kind of recruitment, retention, training and so on for their forces that allow us to make this transition.”
The president, Gates and other leaders have reassured Afghan and Pakistani leaders that Obama’s announcement that U.S. troops in Afghanistan will start to come home in July 2011 does not mean America will walk away from the region.
“Quite frankly, I detest the phrase ‘exit strategy,’” Gates said during testimony at the Senate. “What we are looking at over time is a transition in our relationship with the Afghans,” he said.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: WHAT THEN?
When the mission is accomplished, will we then leave Afghanistan again to its own devices?
On Dec. 24, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. The United States protested the invasion and in the years that followed, America supported and armed Afghan and foreign fighters opposed to the Soviets. Pakistan was a key ally in this struggle, allowing the United States to stage the effort out of their country. The strategy paid off, and in 1989, the last Soviet tank left Afghanistan.
Then the United States left. Pakistan still had millions of Afghan refugees on its territory, Afghanistan itself had perhaps millions of dead from the struggle against the Soviets, and Afghan warlords began fighting among themselves – killing more people and devastating more areas in an already prostrate nation.
On top of that was the Pressler Amendment, named for the South Dakota senator who attached it to legislation. It required the president to affirm that Pakistan was not seeking nuclear weapons. By the late 1980s, nations around the world conceded that Pakistan had nuclear weaponry. The Pressler Amendment kicked in and ended U.S. military aid and contacts with Pakistan in 1990.
“With respect to Pakistan: Because of American withdrawal from the region in the early 1990s, followed by a severing of military-to-military relations, many Pakistanis are skeptical that the United States is a reliable, long-term strategic partner,” said Gates. “We must change that perception.”
Leaders in Pakistan have been shocked in the last year by the inroads the Taliban have made in Pakistan, and the Pakistani army has launched offensives in the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan.
“One of the significant political developments in Pakistan over the last seven or eight months has been a strong shift in public opinion in support of the actions that the Pakistani army is taking, first in Swat and now in South Waziristan,” Gates said in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The threat to both Afghanistan and Pakistan is a nexus among al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and the Taliban in Afghanistan. “And they are mutually reinforcing, both in their narrative and in their operations,” the Secretary said.
Many Pakistanis are Pashtu, which also is the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military and intelligence service developed relationships with Afghan extremist groups when those groups were battling the Soviets.
“They have maintained some of those contacts and those relationships, frankly, as a hedge because of their uncertainty whether the United States would be a reliable partner and ally for them going forward and whether we would remain in Afghanistan until we were assured of success in taking care of the extremists,” Gates said.
Making progress against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan will encourage Pakistani leaders that the United States intends to stand by its allies, Gates said. “As we make progress and as they make progress, their incentive to change this approach, to opt strategically to partner with the United States, becomes significantly more powerful,” he said.
Gates emphasized this on Capitol Hill. “Let me just say … what is essential for our national security is that we have two long-term partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Gates said.
The military relationship is prominent now, “as we try to secure the country and put it in a position where they can accept responsibility for their own security and, frankly, to prevent al-Qaeda from coming back,” the Secretary said.
“But over time, as we are successful in that, the civilian component and the development component of our relationship with Afghanistan will become predominant,” he continued. “We may have a small, residual military training and equipping role with Afghanistan in the future, but this goes to the point I made in my testimony to the Senate: We must not repeat the mistake of 1989 and turn our backs on these folks. And when we've got the security situation with them under control, then the civilian and the development part must be the preponderant part of our relationship far into the future.”
"The United States will continue to work with the Afghan government and military, even after transferring security responsibility to the Afghans," he noted.
“We will not repeat the mistakes of 1989, when we abandoned the country only to see it descend into chaos, and then into Taliban hands,” Gates, who was the deputy director of central intelligence at the time, told senators.
"The border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan is the epicenter of extremist jihadism: the historic place where native and foreign Muslims defeated one superpower and, in their view, caused its collapse at home. Paramilitary fighters took on the Soviet Union after its occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. They fought against the Red Army for years until Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev pulled out the last troops in 1988. “For [extremists] to be seen to defeat the sole remaining superpower in the same place would have severe consequences for the United States and the world," said Gates.
“Less than five years after the last Soviet tank crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan,” he said, “Islamic militants launched their first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. We cannot afford to make a similar mistake again.”













